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GLOSSARY
Covert Channels Any communication channel that can be exploited by a
process to transfer information in a manner that violates the
system’s security policy (Latham, 1986, p. 87).
Digital Forensics The use of scientifically derived and proven methods
toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification,
analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of
digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose
of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found
to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions
shown to be disruptive to planned operations (Palmer, 2001,
p. 16).
False Negatives A False Negative is an incorrect identification of a malicious
activity as being benign (Scarfone & Mell, 2007, p. 2-3).
False Positives A False Positive is an incorrect identification of a benign
activity as being malicious (Scarfone & Mell, 2007, p. 2-3).
Firewall Firewall is a computer system that protects the network from
network-based threats and attacks, and provides a single
choke point where security and audit can be imposed. A
firewall builds a blockade between an internal network that
is assumed to be secure and trusted, and another network,
usually an external (inter)network, such as the Internet, that
is not assumed to be secure and trusted (Oppliger, 1997).
viii
Firewall System Logs Firewall System Logs or Audit Logs are a security-relevant
chronological record, set of records, and/or destination and
source of records that provide documentary evidence of the
sequence of activities that have affected at any time a specific
operation, procedure, or event (Schaeffer, 2010).
Forensic Model A standard structured process that provides a suitable
mechanism to be followed by the computer forensic
investigators while conducting a computer forensic
investigation, as all of their actions are subjected to
scrutiny by the judiciary should the case be presented in the
court (Yusoff, Ismail, & Hassan, 2011, p. 17).
ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) is a
protocol used by IPv6 nodes to report errors encountered
in processing packets, and to perform other internet-layer
functions, such as diagnostics (ICMPv6 “ping”). ICMPv6 is
an integral part of IPv6, and the base protocol is required to
be fully implemented by every IPv6 node (Conta & Gupta,
2006, p. 1).
IDS Intrusion detection System (IDS) is a software that automates
the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer
system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible
incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of
violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies,
or standard security practices (Scarfone & Mell, 2007, p. 2-1).
IDS Signature A signature is a pattern that corresponds to a known
threat. Signature-based detection is the process of comparing
signatures against observed events to identify possible
incidents (Scarfone & Mell, 2007, p. 2-4).
ix
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is a newer version of the
Internet Protocol, designed as the successor to IP version 4
(IPv4). The changes from IPv4 to IPv6 fall primarily into
the following categories: expanded addressing capabilities,
header format simplification, improved support for extensions
and options, flow labeling capability, and authentication and
privacy capabilities (Hinden & Deering, 1998, p. 1).
Network Forensics Network forensics is a sub-branch of digital forensics relating
to the monitoring and analysis of computer network traffic
for the purposes of information gathering, legal evidence,
or intrusion detection. Unlike some other areas of digital
forensics, network investigations deal with volatile and
dynamic information. Network traffic is transmitted and then
lost, so network forensics is often a pro-active investigation
(Casey, 2011; Latham, 1986).
True Negatives A True Negative is a correct identification of a benign activity
as being benign (Scarfone & Mell, 2007, p. 2-3).
True Positives A True Positive is a correct identification of a malicious
activity as being malicious (Scarfone & Mell, 2007, p. 2-3).
x
ABSTRACT
Dominic Savio, Lourdes Gino M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. Building a
digital forensic investigation technique for forensically sound analysis of covert
channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6, using custom IDS signatures and firewall system
logs. Major Professor: Dr. Marcus K. Rogers.
Covert Channels are communication channels used for information transfer, and
created by violating the security policies of a system (Latham, 1986, p. 80).
Research in the field has shown that, like many communication channels, IPv4 and
the TCP/IP protocol suite has features, functionality and options which could be
exploited by cyber criminals to leak data or for anonymous communications,
through covert channels. With the advent of IPv6, researchers are on the lookout
for covert channels in IPv6 and one of them demonstrated a proof of concept in
2006. Nine years hence, IPv6 and its related protocols have undergone major
changes, which introduced a need to reevaluate the current situation of IPv6. The
current research is a continuation of our (author of this thesis - Lourdes, and
committee member - Prof. Hansen) previous studies (Lourdes & Hansen, 2015,
2016), which demonstrated the corroboration of covert channels in IPv6 and
ICMPv6 by building a software for the same and testing against a simulated
enterprise network. Our study had also explained how some of the enterprise
firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) do not currently detect such covert
channels, and how they could be tuned to detect them. The current research aimed
at understanding if these detection mechanisms (IDS signatures) of IPv6 and
ICMPv6 covert channels are forensically sound, and at exploring if the system logs
left by such covert channels in the firewall could provide forensically sound evidence.
The current research showed that the IDS signatures that detected certain covert
channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6, conformed to the forensic soundness criteria of
xi
‘validity of the scientific method’, and ‘known/potential error rates’. The current
research also showed that the firewall system logs potentially detected certain covert
channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6 and also conformed to the forensic soundness criteria
of ‘validity of the scientific method’. Thus the current study showed that these
could be used as digital forensic investigation techniques for network forensics of
certain types of covert channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A covert channel is “a method of communication that is not part of an actual
computer system design, but can be used to transfer information to users or system
processes that normally would not be allowed access to the information” (Rowland,
1997, p. 1). In order to understand the covert channels better, figure 1.1 shows an
example of Alice and Bob, who would like to communicate their meeting time,
secretively and decide to use the telephone ring as a communication mechanism.
Alice, wanting to meet Bob at 1:23am, calls Bob on a public telephone near him,
gives a single ring and cuts the call. Alice waits for a minute, calls Bob again, but
this time gives two rings and cuts the call. Alice then waits for one more minute,
calls Bob again, and gives three rings now and cuts the call. At this point Bob
understands that it is Alice who is trying to communicate the message, “meet at
1:23am”. Also, a 3rd person observing this would not understand this
communication and would discard it as a prank call. Although the true purpose of
the telephone ring is so that the receiver could pick the call to speak, Alice and Bob
successfully created a covert means of communication, which went undetected.
Figure 1.1.: Example of a covert channel
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While potentially disruptive and effective, covert channels are often
underrated and not much importance is given to them. According to Shah, Molina,
Blaze, et al. (2006), this behavior can be explained as effect of covert channels
having low bandwidths and requiring a compromise of a system in the first place.
While the compromise itself would prove to be more fatal to the system, the covert
channel created would have a lesser impact compared to the vulnerability that
allowed the exploit and creation of the covert channel (p. 1). Since covert channels
are hard to detect, there arises a possibility that cyber criminals might exploit those
for covert communication. Hence analyzing and detecting covert channels could help
digital forensic investigators while performing network forensics.
Digital forensic models provide a digital forensic investigator with a
formalized process and set of procedures to be carried out when performing a digital
forensic analysis. The process and procedure used in digital forensic analysis has a
direct impact on the outcome of the digital forensic investigation. Hence it is crucial
for digital forensic investigators to follow a standard structured process (Yusoff et
al., 2011). Although various digital forensic models exist, which address a wide
variety of digital crime scenarios, the center of these models is the analysis phase,
where various investigative techniques are applied to the evidence collected, to
identify the perpetrator of the crime or the crime itself (Yusoff et al., 2011).
The current research was an exploratory study which aimed to create a
digital forensic investigation technique using custom IDS signatures and firewall
system logs, to help in analyzing certain specific covert channel in IPv6 and
ICMPv6, in a forensically sound manner.
1.1 Scope
Covert channels and various studies on the subject have been in existence for
more than four decades. In 1973, Lampson explained a method of exploiting the
communication channels which are “not intended for information transfer at all,
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such as the service program’s effect on the system load” and termed it “covert
channels” as opposed to the “legitimate channels” of communication (p. 614). Many
research studies showed that the weaknesses in the TCP/IP design and
implementation could be exploited, which paved a way for new covert channels in
IPv4 and IPv6. Lourdes and Hansen (2015, 2016) demonstrated the corroboration
of such covert channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6 by building a software for the same
and testing against a simulated enterprise network.
Rowland (1997) explained that these covert channels posed a major security
threat as they could be exploited “in the areas of data smuggling and anonymous
communication” (p. 1). He also noted that the detection of such channels could be
difficult, mainly if they were encrypted. This might pose a major challenge in the
field of digital forensics, mainly network forensics. The current research attempts to
test the forensic soundness of two evidences, custom IDS signatures of Snort and
Suricata IDS, and system logs of pfSense firewall, thereby creating a network
forensic investigation technique, that standardizes the process of a network forensic
analysis of the following covert channel in IPv6:
1. IPv6 Flow Label based covert channel
2. IPv6 Experimental Extension Header based covert channels
3. ICMPv6 based covert channels
1.2 Significance
According to McCusker (2006), cybercrime is a major part of transnational
threat landscape owing to the increasingly complex online activity, that is could be
classified as an organized crime. He also argues that the future of cybercrime resides
in the digital environment that was primarily built to enable business and social
relationships, although susceptible to malicious activity (p. 257). The increase in
cybercrime demands better digital forensics to bring the criminals to justice.
4
According to Marcella Jr and Greenfield (2002), one of the major challenges faced
by digital forensic investigators is the technical challenges that obstruct law
enforcement’s ability to find and prosecute cyber criminals (p. 198). Network
forensics, a sub-branch of digital forensics is no exception to this challenge. Covert
channels are a bigger menace owing to their stealthy nature. Various research
studies attempted to detect covert channels in IPv4 and some were even successful.
But the rapid growth of IPv6 adoption, from 0.14% in January 2009 to 11.23% in
July 2016, is demanding the organizations and businesses to migrate to IPv6
(Google, 2016). This could potentially lead to cybercrime using covert channels in
IPv6 and ICMPv6. Thus the current research was an exploratory study aimed at
solving one of the technical challenges faced when performing forensics of certain
covert channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6, a digital forensic investigation technique.
1.3 Research Question
Can ‘custom IDS signatures’ and ‘firewall system logs’ help in analyzing the
following IPv6 and ICMPv6 based covert channels, and can they be tested for
forensic soundness using the criteria of validity of the scientific method, and
potential error rates:
1. IPv6 Flow Label based covert channel, where the Flow Label field in the IPv6
header is used to send covert data.
2. IPv6 Extension Header based covert channels, where the covert data is sent as
the payload of experimental extension header types 253 and 254.
3. ICMPv6 based covert channels, where the covert data is sent as payloads of
ICMPv6 headers type 1, 2, 3, 4, 128, 129, 253 and 254.
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1.3.1 Statement of the Problem
With increasing number of devices connecting to the Internet everyday, there
is a major paradigm shift from IPv4 to IPv6 addressing, as the Internet began to
run out of IPv4 addresses (Blanchet, 2009). The implementation of IPv6 has
security loopholes that could be exploited to perform covert communication
(Lucena, Lewandowski, & Chapin, 2006). Using such covert channels, it is possible
for cyber criminals, terrorists, whistle-blowers, anti-government groups and insiders
to communicate stealthily. The lack of reliable detection mechanisms of IPv6 and
ICMPv6 covert channels pose a major security threat. Thus the current study
aimed at analyzing the techniques of detection of the following covert channels in
IPv6 and ICMPv6 using custom IDS signatures and firewall system logs:
1. IPv6 Flow Label based covert channel
2. IPv6 Experimental Extension Header based covert channels
3. ICMPv6 based covert channels
The study also aimed at testing the forensic soundness of the techniques. Forensic
soundness of a digital forensic process helps preserve the integrity of the evidence
and could be tested by various criteria. Thus the current research aimed at testing
two of the common criteria between McKemmish (2008) and Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993): the validity of the scientific method and the
known/potential error rates.
1.4 Assumptions
The assumptions of this study were:
1. The network protocol stack exploited in the study is standard, conforming to
their respective RFCs.
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2. The design of the covert channel tool used in the research, is assumed to work
in most of the networking environment. Although, the design of certain
networking environments may prevent the operation of the software.
1.5 Limitations
The limitations of this study were:
1. The study does not focus on IPv4 based covert channels.
2. The study does not focus on covert channels created by TCP or UDP header
exploits.
3. The study does not focus on encrypted covert channels.
4. The study does not take into consideration the network components and the
network topologies that were not part of the design in the methodology.
5. The study does not test all the forensic soundness criteria for the IDS
signatures and firewall system logs.
6. The study does not take into consideration all possible IDS signatures and
firewall system logs.
7. The study being exploratory, does not measure reliability of the digital
forensic investigation technique.
8. The data set generated and used by the study does not represent the real life
traffic. Nor can it be extrapolated to represent real traffic. Moreover the study
does not represent the network environment outside of the Covertv6 tool.
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1.6 Delimitations
The delimitations of this study were:
1. The study focuses only on covert channels created by the Covertv6 tool, which
exploits IPv6 flow label, IPv6 experimental extension headers and ICMPv6
header based covert channels.
2. The study focuses only on unencrypted covert channels.
3. The study includes only the specifications in the RFCs present at the time of
beginning this research.
4. The study was restricted to only pfSense firewall, Snort IDS and Suricata IDS,
and the network topology discussed in the methodology.
5. The study tests the forensic soundness criteria of validity of the scientific
method, and known/potential error rates, only.
6. The study considers only the custom signatures described by Lourdes and
Hansen (2016) and the firewall system logs of pfSense firewall.
7. The dataset generated and used by the study represented the normal ICMPv6
ping packets only. Moreover the study is confined to the network environment
of the Covertv6 tool.
1.7 Summary
This chapter provided the scope, significance, research question,
assumptions, limitations, delimitations, and definitions for the current research. The
next chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to the research.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
2.1 Covert Channels
Covert channels and various research on the subject have been in existence
for more than four decades. In 1973, Lampson (1973) explained a method of
exploiting the communication channels whose purpose was not transfer of
information, and termed it “Covert Channels” as opposed to the “legitimate
channels” of communication (p. 614). In 1986, the Department of Defense not only
gave a formal definition for covert channels but also classified them into “storage
channels” and “timing channels” based on their method of operation (Latham, 1986,
p. 45). While a covert storage channel involves direct/indirect reading/writing of
processes in a covert manner, a covert timing channel involves signaling mechanisms
that modifies the response time, often used to convey the data (Lucena et al., 2006,
p. 148). Since a covert channel exploits a weakness in the system by hiding as a
legitimate channel, it is different from a side channel which exploits the
application’s implementation to leak information (Shah et al., 2006, p. 1). Many
research studies showed that the weaknesses in the TCP/IP design and
implementation could be exploited, which paved a way for new covert channels,
mainly in IPv4. With the migration of IPv4 to IPv6, many researchers have turned
their focus on covert channels in IPv6 (Lucena et al., 2006).
2.2 Evaluating Covert Channels
In 1997, Rowland (1997) showed that IPv4 (mainly TCP in IPv4) has
vulnerabilities that allowed him to exploit these in creating covert channels in his
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implementation, called a “covert TCP program”, thereby leaking vital data through
a network. He specifically used the IP identification field, TCP initial sequence
number field, and TCP acknowledgment number field to show the exploit. He also
explained how these posed a major security threat and how these could be exploited
for smuggling data and communicating anonymously (p. 1). He also noted that the
detection of such channels could be difficult, mainly if they were encrypted or if
packets were mirrored off of a server, making them seem legitimate (p. 1).
Ahsan (2002) furthered the research by Rowland (1997) and presented his
thesis on covert channel analysis and data hiding in IPv4. He not only provided a
compendium of prior research in the field, but also explained various exploits that
allowed the creation of covert channels. He explained that covert channel based on
packet header manipulation were not restricted to only a TCP header, but also
IGMP and ICMP headers by the use of various encoding mechanisms. He also
discussed another method of creation of covert channels, “data hiding through
packet sorting” (p. 53). This method worked based on various algorithms that could
be used to sort and resort packets. These packets could then be encrypted using the
IPSec architecture, thereby providing confidentiality through the network and
avoiding detection of the packet header modifications by powerful firewall or IDS.
Interestingly, he did not discuss the negative implications of covert channels such as
data leakage, rather presented it as a means of improving the network security.
Finally, he noted covert channels on IPv6 as future work, as early as 2002.
Unfortunately, there is no published work of his, on the same.
Llamas, Allison, and Miller (2005) reviewed various research studies on
covert channels at the time and showed the existence of numerous other exploits
than the usual packet header manipulations discussed by the previous researchers,
that allowed the creation of covert channels. They included, ‘Covert Messaging
through TCP Timestamps’, ‘IP Checksum Covert Channels and Selected Hash
Collision’, ‘Malicious ICMP Tunneling’, and ‘Exploiting authorized data streams
over the HTTP protocol’ (p. 3). They also described various implementations of
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covert channels such as, ‘Data Hiding in TCP/IP with HTTP Reverse Proxy
Servers’, and ‘IP Covert Timing Channels’ (p. 4). Like, Ahsan (2002), Llamas et al.
(2005) provided a glimpse of IPv6 covert channel research at that time. They also
showed how Graf (2003) exploited the IPv6 Destination option to create a covert
messaging tool. Even though IPv6 deployments were uncommon even as late as
2008, the research on covert channels in IPv6 existed as early as 2003 (Colitti &
Gunderson, 2008).
2.3 Covert Channels in IPv6
One among the two important research studies, that were the basis for the
current research is, Lucena et al. (2006), while the other one being a proof of
concept by Murphy (2006). To be precise, Lucena et al. (2006) did a
specification-based analysis, to identify flaws and ambiguities in protocols, which
could be exploited to create covert channels, and provided a comprehensive list of 22
covert channels in IPv6 (p. 147). Some of their findings included:
1. The number of research studies on network storage covert channels were more
than the number of research studies on network timing covert channels owing
to the synchronization issues and lower bandwidth of the latter. This
potentially eliminates the need for further study on network timing covert
channels.
2. The most effective defense mechanisms of the time against IPv4 covert
channels were protocol scrubbers, traffic normalizers and active wardens.
They did not explain if these defense mechanisms hold good against IPv6
covert channels, which paves a way for a study on how these mechanism fare
against IPv6 covert channels.
3. There were at least six IPv6 covert channels, created by exploiting six fields in
the IPv6 header such as, Traffic Class, Flow Label, Payload Length, Next
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Header (adding various extension headers to it), Hop Limit and Source
Address.
4. Other potential IPv6 covert channels could be created by exploiting the
extension headers such as the Hop-by-Hop Options Header, Routing Header,
Fragment Header, Destination Options Header, Authentication Header,
Encapsulation Security Payload Header.
5. More covert channels could be created by tunneling traffic such as IPv6 in
IPv4, IPv6 in IPv6 and IPv4 in IPv6.
They finally noted covert channels in ICMPv6 as their future work. But, in the
same year, Murphy (2006) showed this to be possible.
In 2006, Murphy (2006) demonstrated a proof of concept tool called
“V00d00n3t”, which exploited the ICMPv6 echo-reply payload to create a covert
data channel. He showed that he was able to transfer data over the Internet in a
network infrastructure which was designed using a tunnel broker and a set of
routers and servers, as explained in the topology by Murphy (2006). Although the
design validated that the packets would survive in a ‘slick’ 6 network and wild
uncontrolled environments, he noted that the limitation was the survival of the
covert data in a production environment with firewall, IPS/IDS etc. This motivated
the introduction of firewall and IDS in the current research.
2.4 Understanding the Exploitable Fields of IPv6 and ICMPv6
RFC 2460 (Hinden & Deering, 1998) defines the specifications of an IPv6
packet. Figure 2.1 shows the various field of the IPv6 header. Version is a 4-bit field
indicating the version of IP protocol (4 or 6). Traffic class is a 8-bit field indicating
the various classification of traffic for the purpose of Quality of Service (QoS). Flow
label is a 20-bit field used to identify unique flows. RFC 6437 (Rajahalme, Amante,
Jiang, & Carpenter, 2011) explains that IPv6 flow label could be used along with
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source address and destination address to efficiently enable classification of IPv6
flows in case of fixed IPv6 main headers. RFC 6437 mandates that the flow label
not be modified by any networking devices en-route from source to the destination.
This presents a possibility of utilizing this 20-bits for transmitting covert data.
Figure 2.1.: IPv6 header (Baxter, 2016)
The payload length is a 16-bit field that identifies the length of the payload
data. The next header field is a 8-bit field that identifies the subsequent header of
the IPv6 header. According to Hinden and Deering (1998), an IPv6 packet has the
ability to place certain option information as headers, in between the IPv6 header
and the upper-layer header. These are the extension headers. Figure 2.2 shows how
the extension headers fit in the IPv6 header. Various types of IPv6 extension
headers include, Hop-by-Hop options extension header, Routing extension header,
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Fragment extension header, Destination Options extension header, Authentication
extension header, and Encapsulating Security Payload extension header. In addition
RFC 4727 Fenner (2006) defines two experimental header types where the next
header value is 253 and 254. This presents a potential to exploit these two
experimental headers to create covert channels.
Figure 2.2.: IPv6 extension header (Cisco, 2006)
The other fields in the IPv6 header are, hop limit, which identifies the
time-to-live of the packet, the source IPv6 address and the Destination IPv6 address.
RFC 4443 (Conta & Gupta, 2006) defines the specification for ICMPv6
protocol. Figure 2.3 shows an ICMPv6 header along with various ICMPv6 message
types. The type field identifies the type of message, the code field identifies a
sub-type of the message and the checksum field contains a CRC of the ICMPv6
header. The data field contains the payload of the message.
A ICMPv6 destination unreachable packet is sent by any networking device
which does not have the route details to reach the destination, or by the destination
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Figure 2.3.: ICMPv6 header with message types (NDHU, 2003)
itself, when a particular service is unavailable. A ICMPv6 packet too big message is
sent by any networking device who is unable to process the packet owing to its large
size. A ICMPv6 time exceeded message is sent by a networking device which is
unable to forward the packet since the time-to-live of the packet expired. A
ICMPv6 parameter problem packet is sent by a networking device when it faces any
problem in processing the packet. A ICMPv6 echo request is often used by the ping
program to test the reachability of a destination from the source. A ICMPv6 echo
response is the response to a ICMPv6 echo request packet. (Conta & Gupta, 2006)
mandate that the ICMPv6 packet be processed at the destination of the packet and
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not be modified by any forwarding device, unless for security purposes. This
presents a potential for creation of covert channels where the covert data is sent as
the payload of the above message types. In addition, Fenner (2006) adds two
experimental message types, 253 and 254, which could also be potentially used to
transfer covert data.
Although various other fields and headers could be potentially exploited to
create covert channels, the current research is restricted to those created by the
above methods.
2.5 Reevaluating Covert Channels
Although Lucena et al. (2006) discussed the various covert channels in IPv6
and Murphy (2006) showed a proof of concept of the IPv6 covert channels, major
changes have been introduced in IPv6 since 2006, making the research studies
potentially obsolete and introducing the need to understand the current scenario.
Both Lucena et al. (2006) and Murphy (2006) worked on the basis of the three
IPv6-related RFCs that existed in 2006, RFC 2460 (Hinden & Deering, 1998), RFC
3697 (Rajahalme, Conta, & Carpenter, 2004), and RFC 4443 (Conta & Gupta,
2006). According to Lourdes and Hansen (2015), the following are the list of RFC
that underwent major updates:
1. RFC 4294 “IPv6 Node Requirements”, April 2006 (Jankiewicz, Loughney, &
Narten, 2011).
2. RFC 4727 “Experimental Values In IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4, ICMPv6, UDP, and
TCP Headers”, November 2006 (Fenner, 2006)
3. RFC 4884 “Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages”, April 2007
(Bonica, Gan, Tappan, & Pignataro, 2007).
4. RFC 5095 “Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6”, December 2007
(Abley, Savola, & Neville-Neil, 2007; Kaeo, 2007)
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5. RFC 5722 “Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments”, December 2009
(Krishnan, 2009).
6. RFC 5871 “IANA Allocation Guidelines for the IPv6 Routing Header”, May
2010 (Arkko & Bradner, 2010).
7. RFC 6437 “IPv6 Flow Label Specification”, November 2011 (Rajahalme et al.,
2011).
8. RFC 6564 “A Uniform Format for IPv6 Extension Headers”, April 2012
(Krishnan, Woodyatt, Kline, Hoagland, & Bhatia, 2012).
9. RFC 6935 “IPv6 and UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets”, April 2013
(Chimento, Eubanks, & Westerlund, 2013).
10. RFC 6946 “Processing of IPv6 Atomic Fragments”, May 2013 (Gont, 2013).
11. RFC 7045 “Transmission and Processing of IPv6 Extension Headers”,
December 2013 (Jiang & Carpenter, 2013).
12. RFC 7112 “Implications of Over-sized IPv6 Header Chains”, January 2014
(Bonica, Manral, & Gont, 2014)
Taking into consideration the above changes, the author of this thesis, in an
earlier study (Lourdes & Hansen, 2015) aimed at understanding and validating the
presence of covert channels in the present day IPv6 implementations. In addition,
most of the previous research studies were theoretical, without a proper proof of
concept to validate the theory. Thus, this required building a tool that could exploit
the flaws in design and implementation of IPv6 and related protocols to create a
covert channel, thereby providing proof of concept. We demonstrated the
corroboration of such covert channels in IPv6 by building a software called
‘Covertv6’ for the same, and testing against a simulated enterprise network.
17
2.6 Detecting Covert Channels
We furthered our research towards evaluating the capabilities of various
enterprise network security solutions in detecting such covert channels in IPv6, in a
new study (Lourdes & Hansen, 2016). We established the following:
1. Certain enterprise firewall and IDS do not detect the tested covert channels in
IPv6, out-of-the-box.
2. The same firewall and IDS do not detect the tested covert channels in IPv6,
even after enabling all possible features and signatures available at the time of
testing.
3. Custom signatures can be created for possibly detecting certain types of covert
channels (mainly ICMPv6) by white-listing the most common
implementations.
We provided a list of custom signatures for detection of ICMPv6 based covert
channels based on:
1. Non-standard payload length of the ICMPv6 echo request/reply packet: Most
of the ICMPv6 implementation have a payload length less than or equal to
56bytes. Any value above that could be a possible covert channel.
2. Non-standard payload of the ICMPv6 packet: In the case of the ICMPv6 error
messages, the payload is parts of the invoking packet, which would contain
most of the IPv6 header. In the case of ICMPv6 echo request/reply, which are
most commonly used by the ping6 program, the payload is the time-stamp
appended with the alphabets in order or the numerals in increasing order.
Any deviations from these patterns could be a possible covert channel.
3. Non-standard sequence of ICMPv6 packets: Most implementations increment
the sequence number of the consequent ICMPv6 packets. Also, most common
implementation of ICMPv6 echo request/reply packets, ping6, sends 1 packet
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per second. Any deviation from this behavior could be a possible covert
channel.
We also discussed other detection mechanisms specific to our implementation of the
covert channel tool such as:
1. Signature for detecting the magic numbers of most archive file formats such as
zip, tar, bzip, gzip, in addition to detection of most common file types such as
exe/dll, doc, txt etc., in the payload of a packet.
2. Signature for detecting beacons to/from unknown servers.
3. Signature for detecting random flow labels between a set of communicating
hosts.
4. Signature for detecting experimental extension headers as possible covert
channels.
Although these detection mechanisms provided a possible means of detecting certain
covert channels, there is an imminent need to understand the forensic-soundness of
these evidence.
2.7 Defining Network Forensics
Network forensics is the use of various tools, techniques and procedures to
capture, record and analyze network traffic after a network attack. It can be
considered as an extension of network security and involves collection of data after a
network incident, that could be used to investigate more about the attack or that
can be used as evidence against the attacker in the court of law. It is different from
network security in several different ways. While network security concentrates
more on protecting a system against an attack, network forensics is a postmortem
investigation of an attack. While a incident response process does a postmortem
investigation as well, a network forensics process deals with the admissibility of the
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evidence in the court of law (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006). This could
provide one with valuable information, like the identity/location of the attacker,
nature and duration of the attack, the vulnerability that made the attack possible
along with several other factors. Apart from helping to narrow in on the attacker,
such valuable information would also help prevent similar attacks in the future.
There have been a number of definitions for network forensics. Palmer (2001)
defines it as:
The use of scientifically proven techniques to collect, fuse, identify, examine,
correlate, analyze, and document digital evidence from multiple, actively
processing and transmitting digital sources for the purpose of uncovering
facts related to the planned intent, or measured success of unauthorized
activities meant to disrupt, corrupt, and or compromise system components
as well as providing information to assist in response to or recovery from
these activities. (p. 27)
Although, Ranum (1997) was the first to coin the term network forensics and he
defined it as, “the capture, recording, and analysis of network events in order to
discover the source of security attacks or other problem incidents” (p. 1).
2.8 Need for Forensics
Despite the security measures like firewall, intrusion detection systems and
intrusion prevention systems, eventually an attack happens. Given that an attack
has happened, the above said systems are not sufficient to penalize the adversary
according to law. A set of procedures and tools that could relate the attack to the
adversary and collect evidences that could be presented in the court of law are
required. Network forensics is the branch of cyber forensics that does just this.
Given that a security breach in a company would subvert its reputation and trust in
the minds of customers, the companies are working aggressively towards
implementing network security and network forensic measures. The ever increasing
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volume of attacks and the companiesâĂŹ ever growing concern about security are
the main motivation factors behind Network Forensics (Meghanathan, Allam, &
Moore, 2010).
2.9 Challenges in Network Forensics
There are several challenges in carrying out network forensics. For instance,
the network needs to have the infrastructure and the other components required to
conduct a forensic analysis. In many legacy systems, it is harder to incorporate
hardware and software required for the same. Almulhem (2009) analyses some of
the most prevalent challenges. One of the most important challenges is to ensure
data integrity of the collected data. As ensuring the collected evidence’s integrity is
of prime importance in any forensic procedure, it no different for networks. While
ensuring integrity during creating a bit stream image of a hard drive could be easily
achieved, it is more complicated in case of computer networks. Another such issue
noted by Almulhem (2009) is, ensuring the privacy of the users. While a network is
analyzed, it is critical to ensure the privacy of the other users who are connected to
the network but are not associated with the investigation. It is also important to
keep a track of the various data sources in the network. In cases of huge networks,
there might be a huge number of data sources, some of this might also include raw
data. While analyzing all the data sources may be desirable, it is not always
practically possible. The huge volume of data also creates issues while analyzing.
Highly sophisticated tools are required to deal with such huge volume of data
(Almulhem, 2009).
Another important challenge as pointed out by Nehinbe (2011) is the
intrusion redundancy problem. This problem is also referred to as attack swamping,
wherein the attackers cause alarms to go off for no reason and exhaust the
capability of the network analysts to carry out an examination and at times, this
causes the important threats to go unnoticed. As Nehinbe (2011) points out, apart
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from the practical difficulties that arise when trying to implement network forensics,
there are also challenges in conducting research in network forensics. As it is the
case with any research, better results can be obtained only when there is sufficient
and appropriate data to analyze. A network forensic research would usually involve
analyzing various attacks and finding ways to find evidence and techniques for
bringing the perpetrator to the law. But nowadays, data about more sophisticated
attacks are hard to obtain. Victims of such large scale attacks are usually
enterprises from whom data cannot be easily obtained for security reasons. A
solution for this would be to replicate sophisticated network attacks and conduct
research on the data produced during these attacks. But then, replicating these
attacks would require huge amount of resources and it is hard for the researchers to
think from the perspective of the attackers. Even if the companies agree to provide
details regarding the attack, gaining an overall picture from a few attacks is not
easy (Nehinbe, 2011). Thus, the current research was done as a continuation of
(Lourdes & Hansen, 2015, 2016), where the covert channel replication was done by
the former and a detection mechanism was tested by the latter research, due to lack
of data in the field of covert channels.
2.10 Forensic Soundness of Evidence
In the attempt to identify forensically-sound evidence to detect covert
channels in IPv6, it is important to understand the meaning of forensic soundness of
the evidence. One of the profound works in this field is attributed to McKemmish
(2008). He defines forensic soundness as: “the application of a transparent digital
forensic process that preserves the original meaning of the data for production in a
court of law” (p. 10). In his opinion, the forensic soundness of the evidence is
attributed to the forensic process used. Thus he proposed four major criteria for
assessing the forensic soundness of the process and hence the evidence:
1. Unaffectedness of the meaning and interpretation of the electronic evidence.
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2. Identifiability and explanation of all errors.
3. Independent examination and verifiability of the process.
4. Experience of the digital forensic examiner.
In addition, McKemmish (2008) clearly explains that although ‘forensically sound’
describes the whole forensic process, two objectives have to be met: preserving the
state of the data that was acquired and analyzed, and preserving the evidentiary
value of the digital data. Thus to satisfy these objectives, he suggested expressing
the term ’forensically sound’ as a series of steps/procedures and explained that this
approach was logical but non-uniformity would lessen its value. Thus, it becomes
important to understand that, while a network forensic investigation technique for
analyzing covert channels in IPv6/ICMPv6 could be arrived at, by the end of the
research, the applicability of this model towards various similar covert channels
would still be an uncertainty, as explained by McKemmish (2008). While
McKemmish (2008) suggested that evidence needs to preserved as-is, Casey (2007)
suggested that this is often not possible and hence defines the forensic soundness in
a way that “the acquisition process should change the original evidence as little as
possible and any changes should be documented and assessed in the context of the
final analytical results” (p. 50).
Although, the previous research studies explain the meaning of forensic
soundness, the most often used criteria for evaluation of the admissibility or forensic
soundness of an evidence, is the Daubert standard (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993). According to the Daubert standards, four main
factors need to be considered for the admissibility of scientific evidence as follows:
1. Whether the scientific method for obtaining the evidence is testable.
2. Whether the scientific method is peer reviewed and published.
3. The known or potential error rates of the scientific method.
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4. Whether the scientific method is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.
The Mckemmish and Daubert criteria formed the basis for the current
research, which aimed at creating a scientific method (digital forensic investigation
technique) for analyzing certain covert channels in IPv6/ICMPv6, which is
admissible in the court of law, in the United States of America, since the Daubert
criteria and Mckemmish criteria hold good in the United States (Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; McKemmish, 2008). Although, the current
research tried to test only two of the common criteria between both the research:
the validity of the scientific method, and the known/potential error rates of the
methods.
2.11 Digital Forensic Process Models
Digital forensic process models provide a standard structured process which
defines a suitable mechanism to be followed by the computer forensic investigators
(Yusoff et al., 2011). Since the current research strived to create a digital forensic
investigation technique and test it against the forensic soundness criteria, it
becomes important to understand the aspects of various digital forensic process
models, mainly the network forensic process models. While there are many process
models proposed by numerous researchers, Yusoff et al. (2011) provided a detailed
comprehensive study of most of them, thereby helping in understanding their
commonalities and differences. They analyzed the following digital forensic process
models:
1. Computer Forensic Investigative Process (Noblett, Pollitt, & Presley, 2000)
2. DFRWS Investigative Model (Palmer, 2001)
3. Abstract Digital Forensics Model (ADFM) (Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002)
4. Integrated Digital Investigation Process (IDIP) (Carrier, Spafford, et al., 2003)
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5. Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIP) (Baryamureeba &
Tushabe, 2004)
6. Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) (Rogers,
Goldman, Mislan, Wedge, & Debrota, 2006)
7. Digital Forensic Model based on Malaysian Investigation Process (DFMMIP)
(Perumal, 2009)
8. Scientific Crime Scene Investigation Model (Ciardhuáin, 2004)
9. End to End Digital Investigation (Stephenson, 2003)
10. Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation (Ciardhuáin, 2004)
11. A Hierarchical, Objective-Based Framework for the Digital Investigations
Process (Beebe & Clark, 2005)
12. Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation (Köhn, Olivier, & Eloff, 2006)
13. Common Process Model for Incident and Computer Forensics (Freiling &
Schwittay, 2007)
14. Dual Data Analysis Process (Bem & Huebner, 2007)
15. Network Forensic Generic Process Model (Pilli, Joshi, & Niyogi, 2010)
Upon analysis of all these digital forensic process models, they summarized their
findings as below:
1. Five generic phases were common between most of these process models. They
are, pre-process, acquisition & preservation, analysis, presentation, and
post-process.
2. They proposed a new common process model called, the Generic Computer
Forensic Investigation Model (GCFIM).
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3. The differences in these process models were in the content of each phase and
how detailed they were.
Since the current research strived to create a digital forensic investigation technique,
it falls under the analysis phase, which includes performing various techniques of
analysis on the acquired data to find the source of crime and the cyber criminal
(Yusoff et al., 2011, p. 29).
While there are a number of forensic process models to perform disk level
forensics, there was an increased need for process models specific to networks, since
the devices were becoming more and more inter-networked. The first ever Digital
Forensics Research Workshop was held in 2001 and it came up with a model
consisting of the various phases like identification, preservation, collection,
examination, analysis, presentation and decision. This model was considered
abstract and too generalized. Reith et al. (2002) improvised this model by
introducing an abstract model that could be applied to any cyber-crime in general.
The concept of incident response was not introduced until Prosise, Mandia, and
Pepe (2003). A few other notable ones include Carrier et al. (2003), Ciardhuáin
(2004) and Pollitt (2007). Ren (2006) was by far a model that is the most directed
towards network forensics. This has the following steps: capture, copy, transfer,
analysis, investigation and presentation. Their work also included methodologies for
implementation this process model for various types of networks. It should be noted
that these models yielded best results when they were able collaborate well with the
other security measures like Intrusion Detection Systems.
Thus the current research aimed at building a digital forensic investigation
technique using custom IDS signatures and firewall system logs to detect and
analyze some of the IPv6 and ICMPv6 covert channels, and test the forensic
soundness of the methods using the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(1993); McKemmish (2008) criteria of validity and error rates.
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2.12 Summary
This chapter provided a detailed review of literature relevant to the current
research. It explained what a covert channel is, various research studies on covert
channels in IPv4 and IPv6, a clear understanding of the IPv6 and ICMPv6 packets
which would be used to create the covert channels, what network forensics is, how to
establish forensic soundness of evidence, and some of the existing network forensic
models. The next chapter explains framework and methodology of the research.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Goal
The goal of the research was to understand if certain IDS signatures and
firewall system logs, provide forensically sound evidence for detection and analysis
of a subset of IPv6 and ICMPv6 covert channels. Hence the digital forensic
investigation techniques that were tested for forensic soundness were:
1. Detection of certain covert channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6 using custom IDS
signatures.




The research framework consisted of a software tool that could covertly
transfer data through an IPv6 network as described in the network topology in the
figure 3.1. This topology was designed similar to the one tested by Murphy (2006)
in his proof of concept, as an uncontrolled network environment and proved to be
working. The local site designed with a Ubuntu PC (Linux kernel 3.19.0-26) acted
as a client that leaks information. A Cisco router (IOS 15.5(1)T) and a pfSense
firewall (v2.2.4) with Snort (2.9.7.5 pkg v3.2.7) and Suricata (2.0.8 RELEASE pkg
v2.1.6) packages installed, simulated the network on the local site. The pfSense
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firewall connected on its WAN side to the IPv4 Internet, created an IPv6 over IPv4
tunnel to a tunnel broker maintained by Hurricane Electric Electric (2015). The
remote site consisted of a Ubuntu server (Linux kernel 3.19.0-26) that received the
leaked data, and was behind a Cisco router (IOS 15.5(1)T). The Cisco router
connected on its WAN side to the IPv4 Internet, created an IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel
to Hurricane Electric.
Figure 3.1.: Network topology of the simulation
3.2.2 Configuration of the Firewall and IDS
1. The pfSense firewall was configured with the default access control and deep
packet inspection of known protocols. All system logging were enabled with
detailed raw logging capability.
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2. The Snort IDS, which is a proprietary enterprise IDS solution, was configured
with the subscription ruleset, which is “the same Snort ruleset developed for
the NGIPS” and used by businesses, according to (Snort, 2015, p. 1). The
Snort IDS was configured to use all categories of signatures published in the
ruleset ‘Talos Rules 2016-06-07’ (Snort, 2016). In addition, the signatures
described by Lourdes and Hansen (2016) were enabled.
3. The Suricata IDS, “a high performance open-source Network IDS, IPS and
Network Security Monitoring engine” (Suricata, 2015b, p. 1) was configured
with all features described in Suricata (2015a). The Suricata IDS was
configured to use all categories of signatures published in the ruleset along
with Snort subscription ruleset ‘Talos Rules 2016-06-07’ (Snort, 2016). In
addition, the signatures described by Lourdes and Hansen (2016) were enabled.
3.2.3 Covertv6 Tool
The client-server model software called “Covertv6”, developed by Lourdes
and Hansen (2015), using the Scapy library in Python, was used create the covert
channels. The client and server initially send specific beacons indicating liveliness
and start of data transfer. Then the client archives the file/folder in ‘.zip’ format, to
preserve the integrity of the files contained, throughout the binary data transfer
process. The client then reads the bitstream of the zipped data and packs into a
buffer set, which is then encoded differently based on various exploits as follows:
1. IPv6 Flow Label: The client encodes the 20-bit flow label value in a ICMPv6
echo request packet with the buffered data and sends it to the server.
2. IPv6 Experimental Extension Headers: The client encodes the buffered data
into the payload/value field of the experimental extension header with type
253 and 254.
3. ICMPv6: ICMPv6 based exploit is done as below:
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(a) Destination Unreachable - The client sends the buffered data as payload
in the ‘destination unreachable’ message with ICMPv6 type 1 code 0
(b) Packet Too Big - The client sends the buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 2 code 0 message
(c) Time Exceeded - The client sends the buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 3 code 0 message
(d) Parameter Problem - The client sends the buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 4 code 0 message, with the pointer set to ‘0xFF’
(e) Echo Request - The client sends the buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 128 code 0 message
(f) Echo Reply - The client sends the buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 129 code 0 message
(g) Experimental ICMPv6 - The client sends the buffered data as payload in
the ICMPv6 type 253, 254 code 0 message
The server receives the packets and decodes the exploited field and adds it to its
buffer for data reconstruction. As soon as all the data is transferred, the client and
server send end beacons to signal the end of transfer. The server reconstructs the
‘.zip’ file from the bitstream and extracts the archive to get the transferred data.
3.2.4 IDS Signatures
Both Snort and Suricata IDS were configured with the subscription ruleset
and all categories of the signatures were enabled. As shown by Lourdes and Hansen
(2016), these signatures were not sufficient to detecting these covert channels.
As described by Lourdes and Hansen (2016), the following list of signatures
were created and tested against their corresponding covert channels:
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1. Signature 1: Alert if ICMPv6 payload length is greater than 32 Bytes.
This was in accordance to most ICMPv6 based tools sending data less
that 32 Bytes.
2. Signature 2: Alert if ICMPv6 payload of length 32 Bytes but does not
contain the pattern ‘abcdefghij’. This was in accordance to most
ICMPv6 based tools sending data that contained that pattern.
3. Signature 3: Alert if ICMPv6 echo request or reply contains other
extension headers. This was in accordance to most ICMPv6 based tools
not using extension headers.
4. Signature 4: Alert if a sequence of ICMPv6 echo request or reply
packets between two hosts, within a particular time interval, do not
have incremental sequence numbers. This was in accordance to most
ICMPv6 based tools sending ICMPv6 packets whose sequence number
increments.
5. Signature 5: Alert if a sequence of ICMPv6 echo request or reply
packets between two hosts, arrive at a rate not equal to 1 pkt/sec,
within a particular time interval. This was in accordance to most
ICMPv6 based tools sending data at the rate of 1 pkt/sec.
6. Signature 6: Alert if a beacon (containing start or end of leak) is sent or
received to/from external networks. This was in accordance to the
architecture of the Covertv6 tool and how it works. It sends a start and
end beacon during a covert communication.
7. Signature 7: Alert if flow labels are different within a particular time
interval, in a communication between two hosts. This was in accordance
to the violation of RFC 3697, which mandates a source and destination
to identify its individual flows by a single flow label.
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8. Signature 8: Alert if the IPv6 or ICMPv6 packets had experimental
extension header values. This was in accordance to most IPv6 and
ICMPv6 based implementations not sending experimental headers.
9. Signature 9: Alert if ICMPv6 packets contain the magic numbers of
most common file types such as exe/dll, doc, txt etc., in the payload.
This was in accordance to the architecture of the Covertv6 tool and how
it works.
10. Signature 10: Alert if ICMPv6 packets contain the magic numbers of
archive and compression file-formats such as zip, tar, bzip, gzip etc., in
the payload. This was in accordance to the architecture of the Covertv6
tool and how it works.
The IDSs were configured to produce alert for these signatures per every flow.
A flow is defined as a sequence of packets transferred from a source to a destination,
which the source likes to call as a flow. A flow could be all packets in that
connection or a stream of media, but may not necessarily be mapped one-to-one
(Rajahalme et al., 2004, p. 1). So the IDS produced alerts in the following manner:
1. In the case of signatures that detect IPv6 flow label based covert channels, a
single alert was produced as soon as the corresponding signature was fired.
2. In the case of signatures that detect IPv6 experimental extension header based
covert channels, a single alert was produced for every packet encountered with
the experimental extension header. Since this would overflow the logging
system, the IDS were configured to produce just one alert for every 100
packets encountered. So, as soon as the first covert packet with experimental
extension header hits the IDS, the corresponding signature was fired and an
alert was produced. Then the IDS waited for 99 more packets to produce the
second alert.
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3. In the case of signatures that detect ICMPv6 based covert channels, the
signatures 1, 2, 3, 6 & 8 produced alerts on a per-packet or summary basis,
while the signatures 4, 5, 7, 9 & 10 produced alerts on a per-flow basis as
described above.
While, not all signatures were fired for every covert channel, the current research
considered the custom IDS signatures as a whole system. Hence a hit on one
signature was considered a hit for the entire system. Hence the study on which
signatures were hit more or less, was out of scope of the research.
3.3 Analytical Procedure
The Covertv6 tool was run to create the above specified covert channels in
IPv6 and ICMPv6, under the following four conditions:
1. Condition 1: Varying the size of the leaked data in the covert packets by
transferring an ISO file of size 1MB and then 2MB. Time interval between
transfer was set to a default value of 1 sec. No noise of overt traffic was
introduced. Since the current research did not attempt to test the
performance of the system at different covert packet sizes, the values were set
to 1MB and 2MB. A higher value is out of scope of the study.
2. Condition 2: Varying the time interval of transfer between each covert
packets. The time intervals were, 1 sec, 5 sec, 10 sec and 20 sec. The 1MB
ISO file was transferred. No noise of overt traffic was introduced.
3. Condition 3: Varying the time randomness of transfer of the covert packets by
randomly generated time intervals between transfer. The 1MB ISO file was
transferred. No noise of overt traffic was introduced.
4. Condition 4: Varying the noise level of overt data traffic, by generating
ICMPv6 ping packets between the client and server, at the following data
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rates: 1Mbps, 10Mbps and 100Mbps. The 1MB ISO file was transferred
covertly, with time interval set to 1 sec.
The noise of the overt traffic was used to simulate a normal ICMPv6 flow
between two endpoints. This noise was introduced in order to study the error rates
of the custom IDS signatures. By no means was this overt traffic representative of a
real life data traffic, and the tests were confined to the environment of the Covertv6
tool. 10 iterations of each of above tests were run, in order to establish the validity
of the scientific method. The scientific method would be deemed valid if it produced
consistent results in all the 10 iterations.
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis
3.4.1 Measuring Error Rates of Custom Signatures
False positive rate and false negative rate of each of the custom signatures
enabled above was measured in order to establish the forensic soundness based on
the criteria proposed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993);
McKemmish (2008). It was calculated as follows:
FPR = FP/(FP + TN) (3.1)
FNR = FN/(FN + TP ) (3.2)
where, FPR is the False Positive Rate, FP is the number of False Positives, TN is
the number of True Negatives, FNR is the False Negative Rate, FN is the number of
False Negatives and TP is the number of True Positives. Among the four conditions
tested above, only condition 4 provided the details needed for the above calculation,
since the error rates had to be calculated when overt traffic was flowing along with
covert traffic. A regular ICMPv6 ping flow was used as overt data to test each of
the 10 signatures since, the covert data is a variation of the overt data. So, the
following steps were carried out:
35
1. Step 1: The overt data containing ICMPv6 ping packets were first run
through the IDS with the custom signatures enabled. The number of false
positives, false negatives, true positives, and true negatives, were calculated.
2. Step 2: The same overt data was run through along with the covert data, and
the same numbers were calculated.
3.4.2 Exploring Evidences Provided by Firewall System Logs
The firewall system logs from the pfSense firewall was carefully explored to
observe any potential markers that identify the covert channel exploited. The entire
process was recorded and the results of the analysis is presented.
3.5 Threats to Validity
1. The hardware and software capability of the network components pose a
threat to validity since the components might behave differently under stress.
2. Not all exploits have to necessarily be implemented the way it is done in the
Covertv6 tool. A different method of the same exploit might produce a
different result.
3.6 Summary




All the tests were run successfully as per the methodology and the results
were collected and analyzed and presented below. The figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4,
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the running of the Covertv6 tool, a sample capture of the
exploit, configurations of the IDS signatures (including custom signatures),
configuration of the firewall system logs, and sample firewall logs, taken during the
tests.
Figure 4.1.: Running the Covertv6 tool
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Figure 4.2.: Sample capture of covert data
4.1 Validity of the Scientific Method
4.1.1 Custom IDS Signatures
It was observed that in each of the 10 iterations of the four test conditions,
totaling 100 test cases (2x10, 4x10, 1x10, 3x10 tests for conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4
respectively), the corresponding covert channels detected by each of the 10 custom
signatures was consistent at a 100% detection rate.
4.1.2 Firewall System Logs
pfSense (2016) clearly explains the various system logs a pfSense firewall
generates for the traffic that passes through it. Among these system logs, the ones
which were of interest to the current research were the following:
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Figure 4.3.: Enabling all signature categories in Snort
1. Log Type 1: <Timestamp> <Hostname> filterlog: <rule_number>
<sub_rule_number> <anchor> <tracker> <real_interface> <reason>
<action> <direction> <ip_version = 6> <class> <flow_label != 0>
<hop_limit> <protocol> <protocol_id> <length> <source_ip>
<destination_ip>
2. Log Type 2: <Timestamp> <Hostname> filterlog: <rule_number>
<sub_rule_number> <anchor> <tracker> <real_interface> <reason>
<action> <direction> <ip_version = 6> <class> <flow_label>
<hop_limit> <protocol = other> <protocol_id = 253 or 254> <length>
<source_ip> <destination_ip>
3. Log Type 3: <Timestamp> <Hostname> filterlog: <rule_number>
<sub_rule_number> <anchor> <tracker> <real_interface> <reason>
<action> <direction> <ip_version = 6> <class> <flow_label>
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Figure 4.4.: Enabling custom signatures in Snort
<hop_limit> <protocol = ICMPv6> <protocol_id = 58> <length>
<source_ip> <destination_ip> <icmp_type = 1> <icmp_dest_id =
random_string> <icmp_protocol_id = random_string>
4. Log Type 4: <Timestamp> <Hostname> filterlog: <rule_number>
<sub_rule_number> <anchor> <tracker> <real_interface> <reason>
<action> <direction> <ip_version = 6> <class> <flow_label>
<hop_limit> <protocol = ICMPv6> <protocol_id = 58> <length>
<source_ip> <destination_ip> <icmp_type = 253 or 254>
5. Log Type 5: <Timestamp> <Hostname> filterlog: <rule_number>
<sub_rule_number> <anchor> <tracker> <real_interface> <reason>
<action> <direction> <ip_version = 6> <class> <flow_label>
40
Figure 4.5.: Enabling all signature categories in Suricata
<hop_limit> <protocol = ICMPv6> <protocol_id = 58> <length>
<source_ip> <destination_ip> <icmp_type>
The above logs signify the following events:
1. Log type 1 identifies an IPv6 packet with non-zero flow label.
2. Log type 2 identifies an IPv6 packet with experimental extension header.
3. Log type 3 identifies an ICMPv6 destination unreachable packet whose
payload is non-standard.
4. Log type 4 identifies an ICMPv6 packet with experimental type value.
5. Log type 5 identifies a generic ICMPv6 packet.
It was observed that in each of the 10 iterations of the four test conditions,
totaling 100 test cases, one of the above five log types was produced. Although, log
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Figure 4.6.: Enabling custom signatures in Suricata
type 5 did not identify any particular covert channel, thereby deeming a detection
rate of 80%.
4.2 Error Rates
4.2.1 Custom IDS Signatures
In each of the 10 iterations of the condition 4 tests, totaling 30 (3x10) test
cases, the following was observed:
1. Step 1: FP, TP, FN and TN of the overt data was calculated and the values
were,
FP = 0;TP = 0;FN = 0;TN = 0; (4.1)
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Figure 4.7.: Sample Firewall system logs in pfSense
2. Step 2: FP, TP, FN and TN of the mixed data was calculated and the values
were:
FP = 0;TP = 0;FN = 0;TN = 0; (4.2)
It was observed that the corresponding covert channels detected by each of the 10
custom signatures did not generate any false positives or false negatives.
FPR = 0/(0 + TN) = 0% (4.3)
FNR = 0/(0 + TP ) = 0% (4.4)
Hence, the false positive rate and false negative rates of these custom signatures
were 0%.
4.3 Exploratory Analysis of Firewall System Logs
Owing to the exploratory nature of the study with respect to the firewall
system logs, the error rates of the detectability of covert channels using the firewall
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system logs were not calculated. But, the system logs were analyzed for potential
markers for identifying covert channels. The analysis is as below:
1. All the data flow through the pfSense firewall produced detailed system logs as
described in pfSense (2016).
2. Log type 1 had a marker with flow label not equal to 0. A log analysis tabling
source IP, destination IP and flow label fields was able to identify a flow with
varying flow label field between the same source and destination, which could
potentially be used to analyze the IPv6 flow label based covert channel.
3. Log type 2 had a marker with protocol id set to 253 or 254 denoting the
presence of experimental extension headers in the IPv6 packet. This could
potentially be used to analyze the IPv6 experimental extension header based
covert channel.
4. Log type 3 had a marker with ICMP destination and protocol set to random
values, indicating that the ICMPv6 destination unreachable packet was in
non-conformance to the RFC. This could potentially be used to analyze the
ICMPv6 destination unreachable based covert channel.
5. Log type 4 had a marker with ICMPv6 type set to 253 or 254 denoting the
presence of experimental ICMPv6 types in the ICMPv6 packet. This could
potentially be used to analyze the ICMPv6 experimental type based covert
channel.
6. Log type 5 did not have any markers. All of the remaining covert channel
tested in the study, produced this log type. The absence of markers could be




This chapter summarized the results and provided an analysis of the results.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
The current research successfully created two digital forensic investigation
techniques: ‘analyzing certain IPv6 and ICMPv6 covert channels using custom IDS
signatures’ and ‘analyzing certain IPv6 and ICMPv6 covert channels using firewall
system logs’. The research also successfully tested some of the forensic soundness
criteria: the validity of the scientific method, and known/possible error rates,
against these two techniques. The research thoroughly studied the results and a
clear understanding of the results is presented below.
Each of the 10 iterations of the tests conducted with the custom IDS
signatures produced consistent results with respect to the detectability of the covert
channels discussed. It was also observed that the detection rate was 100%. This
provides evidence of the validity of the scientific method employed, ie., custom IDS
signatures. This potentially substantiates the validity of the custom IDS signatures
created by Lourdes and Hansen (2016), in identifying and analyzing the
IPv6/ICMPv6 covert channels discussed in the study. Although the custom IDS
signatures were tested under 4 different operating conditions, the measurement of
error rates such as false positive rate and false negative rates could only be
calculated when there was a presence of overt traffic along with the covert traffic
tested (condition 4). The results showed that in each of the 10 iterations of the tests
performed under condition 4, the false positive rate was 0% and the false negative
rate was 0%. This could be attributed to the custom tailoring of the signatures to
match the exact covert channel or covert channel creation mechanism. Hence, it
could be inferred that an understanding of the covert channels could potentially
help in identifying patterns that could be used to detect them. Thus the results
provide a calculated error rate of 0%, while employing the forensic investigation
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technique of custom IDS signatures created by Lourdes and Hansen (2016), in
identifying and analyzing the IPv6/ICMPv6 covert channels discussed in the study.
Thus, the custom IDS signatures created by Lourdes and Hansen (2016) was
tested against the two common digital forensic soundness criteria between Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and McKemmish (2008). The other
two criteria of McKemmish (2008), ‘reliability’ and ‘expertise of the forensic
examiner’ could not be tested as a part of this research. While ‘reliability’ could
only be tested by running the tests multiple times by independent researchers, the
‘expertise of the forensic examiner’ is purely subjective to the forensic examiner and
is independent of the method used. Hence these two criteria were not tested by the
current research study. Similarly, the other two criteria of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), ‘peer review’ and ‘acceptance in scientific community’
could not be tested as a part of this research. Like in the case of McKemmish
(2008), Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) criteria of ‘peer
review’ requires publishing the techniques and a thorough review by peers and
experts, and the criteria of ‘acceptance in scientific community’ would be the result
of it. Hence the current research did not attempt to test those criteria. But, once
these criteria have been tested, these custom IDS signatures created by Lourdes and
Hansen (2016) could potentially be used as digital forensic investigation technique
in the digital forensic investigation process.
Each of the 10 iterations of the tests conducted with the pfSense firewall
system logs produced consistent results with respect to the detectability of the
covert channels discussed. It was also observed that the detection rate was 80%.
This provides evidence of the testability of verifiability of the scientific method
employed, ie., pfSense firewall system logs. This potentially substantiates the
validity of the pfSense firewall system, in identifying and analyzing the
IPv6/ICMPv6 covert channels discussed in the study. Although log types 1 through
4 provided potential evidence for the presence of the covert channels tested, log type
5 was a more generic log type and did not provide markers for detection of the
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covert channels tested. A detailed study of the log type 5 showed that these markers
were not present because the firewall was logging only the headers of IPv6/ICMPv6
packets and not the payload of the IPv6/ICMPv6 packets, which would have
provided more insight of the data being carried. In addition, log types 1 through 4,
potentially identified the presence of an anomaly while compared with normal
traffic. But by no means could they successfully validate the anomaly to be a covert
channel. This was one of the major challenges faced by the research while trying to
identify the detectability of the firewall system logs.
In order to understand the error rates of the firewall system logs method in
detecting the covert channels tested, the research has to be carried out under
various test conditions which were out of the scope of this research, owing to the
exploratory nature of the research with respect to the firewall system logs. Thus the
current research tested only one of the two common criteria between Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and McKemmish (2008), ‘the validity of
the scientific method’. The current research was unable to test the other three
criteria of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and of McKemmish
(2008). Once these criteria have been tested, the firewall system logs could
potentially be used as digital forensic investigation technique in the digital forensic
investigation process.
Thus, while the current research successfully created two digital forensic
investigation techniques for forensically sound analysis of certain covert channels in
IPv6 and ICMPv6, the custom IDS signatures and the firewall system logs, the
techniques still require additional forensic soundness tests such as peer review of the
methods and wide acceptance of the techniques.
5.1 Challenges Faced
Some of the main challenges faced during the study were:
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1. Constantly changing network infrastructure due to reliance on the internet to
route the traffic from local site to remote site. This was mitigated by creating
static infrastructure.
2. Constantly changing software due to upgrades by the product vendors. This
was mitigated by fixing the software version to specific versions as discussed in
the methodology.
3. Constantly changing configuration, mainly the IDS signatures. This was
mitigated by fixing the IDS rule set version to a specific version as discussed in
the methodology.
5.2 Future Work
The future work on the research will be a study on encrypted covert
channels. The future work will also attempt to test forensic soundness of other
network forensic evidences such as flow data, packet captures, and network device
databases, towards analyzing the covert channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6. Another
potential future work would be to measure the error rates of the firewall system logs
while detecting the covert channels in IPv6.
5.3 Summary
This chapter provided a detailed discussion of the research, explaining the
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